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THE INTERACTION OF THE ADA, THE FMLA, 
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION: WHY CAN'T 
WE BE FRIENDS? 
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy * 
Each year, many workers suffer on-the-job injuries that require them to 
miss work or leave the workplace completely. I Although more action needs to 
be taken to prevent workplace injuries, the state and federal governments have 
enacted many laws to protect employees from some of the harsher effects of 
workplace injuries. State workers' compensation laws, as well as the state and 
federal disability and family medical leave statutes, provide a variety of 
. protections for injured workers, including medical compensation, medical leave 
and, in some cases, workplace restructuring. Unfortunately, these statutes may 
overlap in ways that are not helpful to injured employees or their employers. 
For example, the purpose of workers' compensation is to provide medical and 
cash benefits to injured employees quickly, simply, and at low cost to both the 
employee and employer.2 But when an employee is seriously injured on the 
job, requires time away from work, and returns to work with a permanent 
disability, workers' compensation is no longer quick, simple, or cheap for the 
employer. The employee may also receive protection under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), as 
well as state versions of these acts, so the employer must carefully weigh the 
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; J.D., Duke Law School; B.A., College of 
William & Mary. Thank you to the Brandeis School of Law for inviting me to participate in the 
Nineteenth Annual Carl A. Warns, Jr., Labor and Employment Law Institute and for their 
assistance with this article. Thank you to Matthew M. Malloy and Professor Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., for their helpful comments on this piece. Many thanks also to the invaluable 
research assistance provided by Marlaina Friesthler. All errors and omissions are my own. 
I See Louis Uchitelle, Laid-Off Workers Swelling the Cost of Disability Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2002, at Al (discussing increase of 2.4 million workers on Social Security Disability 
Income ("SSDI") resulting in a sixty billion dollar price tag last year from this program). These 
statistics do not reflect the amount spent on workers' compensation, Americans with Disabilities 
Act or Family Medical Leave Act claims .. 
2 See, e.g., Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Scearce, 896 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1995) (finding that 
the purpose of Kentucky's workers' compensation statute is to provide for swift and inexpensive 
resolution of compensation claims); Mitee Enters. v. Yates, 865 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1993) 
(holding that the fundamental purpose of Kentucky's workers' compensation act is prompt 
resolution of such claims). 
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circumstances to consider to which benefits the employee is entitled. The 
confusion that results causes problems ranging from delays in appropriate 
worker protections, to wrongful denials or grants of benefits, to costly litigation. 
If an employer errs in the employee's favor, the costs may be minimal. 
However, if the employer deals with hundreds or thousands of injured 
employees each year, the costs of these small errors may actually be quite large. 
If, on the other hand, the employer makes a one-time error in his own favor, the 
costs of the resulting litigation could be terribly damaging. 
As employers struggle in this landscape, which they perceive to have razor 
sharp edges, others reap the rewards. This treacherous landscape is the home to 
a new profession: Medical Leave Administration, Management, and Retum-To-
Work Services.3 Professionals in this field are health care providers who lend 
their unbiased expertise to confused employers. To the employers, these 
counselors provide a helping hand across the rough terrain. More guidance 
comes from the assortment of new human resources software programs that 
have been developed to basically administer the FMLA for the employer.4 
Imagine how injured employees must be feeling as they attempt to discern what 
benefits they are entitled to receive. Clearly, statutes that require professional 
assistance to employers in order for the benefits of those statutes to be handled 
properly does not appear to be in either the employer's or the employee's best 
interest. 
This Article addresses some of the issues that arise when an employee 
injured at work qualifies for leave under the ADA, the FMLA and workers' 
compensation statutes. Part II of the Article provides a brief overview of these 
three statutory schemes, focusing on the provisions, which define employee and 
employer qualification and the rights and responsibilities surrounding leave due 
to a work-related injury.5 Part III examines how the courts have resolved some 
of the overlapping and conflicting provisions contained in these statutes.6 This 
section particularly focuses on how the courts address employer obligations 
under all three statutes when an employee requests leave from work, as well as 
when an employee returns to work and requests a modified work schedule. 
Finally, this Article provides an overview of some of the potential solutions that 
a variety of commentators have suggested to help clarify the conflicting duties 
3 See, e.g., http://www.workandwell.com. 
4 For example, FMLA Pro is software that helps employers to track FMLA time and 
comply with FMLA regulations. See http://www.fmla.com. 
5 See infra notes 8-118 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 119-89 and accompanying text. 
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and responsibilities of employers and employees under the ADA, FMLA and 
the Workers' Compensation statutes.7 
I. THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101- 12213 
In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act"),8 
Congress found that discrimination and prejudice deny disabled persons the 
opportunities available to other members of free society, thereby preventing 
their ability to live independently and productively.9 The purpose of the ADA 
is to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities in all aspects of 
their daily lives. 10 The ADA prohibits disability discrimination in employment, 
government services, housing and public accommodations. II 
Title I of the ADA bars disability discrimination in employment. Title I of 
the ADA applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees on each 
working day of at least twenty weeks of either the current or preceding year. 12 
Although the ADA specifically prohibits state and local governments from 
7 See infra notes 190-241 and accompanying text. 
s 42 U.S.e. § 12101- 12213 (2000). The precursor to the ADA is the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973,29 U.S.C. § 791, which also prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals. The 
Rehabilitation Act, however, has a much narrower scope than the ADA and applies only to 
employment by federal agencies, federal contractors and recipients of federal financial 
assistance. See id. Because of its limited scope, a majority of public and private sector 
employees rely on the ADA to redress their disability discrimination claims. As a result, this 
Article will focus on the ADA. 
9 See 42 U.S.e. § 12101(a)(9). For a discussion of the history of the ADA and its 
enactment, see LAURAF. ROTHSTEIN, DISABIUTIES AND THE LAW §§ 1.02, 1.05 (2d ed. 1997 & 
Supp. 2000); Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-e.L. L. REv. 413 
(1991); Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy - 25 Years, 22 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2000); Jonathan Drimmer, Note, Cripples, Overcomers. and 
Civil Righs: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with 
Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993). 
IO See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
II See id. §§ 12101-12213; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, §§ 4-7. 
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A); Doe v. William Shapiro, Esq., P.e., 852 F. Supp. 1256 
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that a law office employing a legal staff often employees, but which 
was part of a larger leasing company, satisfied the ADA's employee requirement). 
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discriminating against disabled individuals, 13 it is unclear how much protection 
the ADA provides to state employees. 14 The Supreme Court has held that Title 
I does not permit state employees to sue for damages in federal court. 15 
However, Title II, which applies to state governments, may prohibit disability 
discrimination in state employment. 16 Although the Department of Justice has 
interpreted the ADA's Title II in this manner, I 7 the courts are split as to whether 
a state employee may sue under Title II for employment discrimination. IS 
Title I of the ADA applies to employees who are qualified individuals with 
a disability. 19 A person is a qualified individual with a disability if he or she is 
able to perform the essential functions of a job with or without a reasonable 
accommodation.2o 
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting state and local governments from discriminating 
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities). 
14 See Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric 
Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court has wrongly interpreted 
the Eleventh Amendment and has failed to respect Congress's power to eradicate discriminatory 
conduct); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May 
Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 
91 (2000); William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the 
Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Coun, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1167 (2002) (providing an 
argument for the validity and benefits of the Supreme Court's new federalism); Ronald D. 
Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REv. 
1183 (2002) (discussing and critiquing the recent Supreme Court decisions limiting Congress's 
power to protect civil rights, including the rights ofthe disabled). 
15 See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that in enacting the ADA 
Congress did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity because it failed to show a 
pattern of discrimination by the states against disabled persons); Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, 
The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 1075 (2002) (discussing some of the remaining available remedies for disabled 
state employees against their employers); Brent W. Landau, Note, State Employees and 
Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and Strategies for Enforcing Federal Employment Laws, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity doctrine 
and the availability of alternative suits for damages in state courts under state laws). 
16 See 42 U.S.c. § 12131(1)(A). 
17 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2002). 
18 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 630 n.1 (noting the split in the circuit courts as to whether Title 
II applies to state employment but not resolving it). In addition to the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act, mQst states have enacted statutes to protect the disabled from a variety of 
disability discrimination. For a discussion of some of the wide array of state disability statutes, 
see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.07. 
19 See 42 U.S.c. § 12112(a). 
20 See id. § 12111(8). 
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The ADA defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.,,21 This definition has been the subject of several recent Supreme 
Court cases.22 In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that if 
a person is able to mitigate the effects of a disability, a court should consider 
the effects of the disability in the corrected state when determining whether the 
person is disabled within the meaning of the statute.23 The Court applied this 
rule in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, where it ruled that summary judgment 
was appropriate as to whether a disability limits a major life activity because the 
record showed that, when medicated, the disability did not substantially limit 
any major life activity.24 In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingsburg, the Court 
reiterated that the substantial limitation provided in the definition of a disability 
requires more than a mere difference in the person's ability to perform a major 
life activity.25 The person must have a limitation that is "in fact substantial.,,26 
And finally, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ky., Inc., v. Williams, the Court 
stated that having a mere impairment does not make a person disabled under 
the ADA, even if the impairment affects the person's ability to work.27 Rather, 
the impairment must affect "tasks of central importance" to the people's lives.28 
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability. 29 Discrimination includes 
not making a reasonable accommodation for a qualified individual with a 
disability.30 A reasonable accommodation may include 'job restructuring, part-
time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition 
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.,,31 An 
21 /d. § 12102(2). See also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.08. 
22 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc. v. 
Kirkingsburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
23 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
24 See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
25 See Albertson, 527 U.S. at 565. 
26 /d. 
27 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195. 
28 See id. at 187. 
29 See 42 U.S.c. § 12112(a) (2000); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.10. 
30 See 42 U.S.c. § 12112(5)(A). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). See also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.20. 
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employer is only required to provide a reasonable accommodation for an 
employee if doing so will allow the disabled employee to perform the essential 
functions of the job.:12 
An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation for a disabled 
applicant employee unless doing so would constitute an undue hardship.33 An 
undue hardship is "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.,,34 
Whether an accommodation amounts to an undue hardship should be 
considered in light of: 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in 
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons 
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the 
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the 
facility; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of 
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its 
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the 
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.35 
When an employer learns that an employee is a qualified individual with a 
disability, the employer must participate in an interactive process with the 
employee to determine whether a reasonable accommodation might exist.36 
The employer only needs to accommodate the employee in performing the 
essential functions of the job. 37 An essential function is a fundamental duty of 
32 See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). 
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.20. 
34 42 U.S.c. § 12111(1O)(A). 
35 42 U.S.c. § 12111(10)(B). See Jones v. Int'l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (finding that whether a modification to a work schedule is reasonable or an undue 
hardship is to consider its effectiveness in light of the nature of the disability and its costs); 
Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that allowing the 
substitution of vacation time for sick leave would be an undue hardship on this employer due to 
cost factors). 
36 See, e.g., Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001); 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.20. 
37 See Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 577 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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the job.38 The Act requires that consideration be given "to the employer's 
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has 
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for 
the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions 
of the job.,,39 In addition, courts also generally consider the consequences of 
not requiring the function, as well as the work experience of current and prior 
. b 40 mcum ents. 
If an employer violates Title I of the ADA, the employee may bring a 
private cause of action to enforce her rightS.41 Remedies for violation of the 
Act include compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief.42 A 
successful employee-plaintiff is also entitled to recover attorney's fees.43 
B. The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. § 2601 - 2654 
The purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA" or "Act") is 
"to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families.,,44 To 
accomplish this purpose, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to 
twelve work weeks of leave during any twelve-month period because of the 
birth or adoption of a child, because of the need to care for a family member 
with a serious medical condition, or because of the employee's serious medical 
condition.45 The FMLA reflects Congress's concern that the primary 
responsibility for family care mainly falls on women and that such family 
responsibilities greatly affect the working opportunities of women more than 
those of men.46 Because a history of unconstitutional legislation mandating 
stereotypical family roles existed, Congress determined that women were 
unfairly losing jobs, and promotions to better jobs and remedies were required. 
Thus, the FMLA attempts to minimize the potential for employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring that leave is available for health 
38 See Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2001). 
39 42 U.S.c. § 12111(8). See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.11 (discussing fundamental and 
essential functions). 
40 See Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 55. 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
42 See 42 U.S.c. § 12112(d); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 198 F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 
1999) (holding punitive damages appropriate when management discriminated against disabled 
employee); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.26. 
43 See Carr v. Fort Morgan Sch. Dist., 4 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D. Colo. 1998). 
44 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(I) (2000). 
45 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I). 
46 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). 
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and medical reasons, as well as important family reasons on a sex-neutral 
b 
. 47 aSls. 
The FMLA applies to employers who employ fifty or more employees 
during twenty or more work weeks in either the current or preceding calendar 
year.48 However, an employer is excluded from the Act if fewer than fifty 
employees work within a seventy-five mile radius of the worksite.49 To be 
eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must have worked for the covered 
employer for at least twelve months, including at least 1,250 hours in the 
previous twelve-month period. 50 Although the FMLA applies to states and 
state agencies,51 a majority of the federal circuit courts have held that states are 
not subject to the FMLA because the FMLA is not a valid exercise of 
Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 The 
Supreme Court will resolve this issue this term.53 Based on the Supreme 
Court's current federalismjurisprudence,54 it may be that state employees will 
47 See id. § 260l(b). 
48 See id. § 2611(4). 
49 See id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). 
50 See id. § 2611(2)(A). 
51 See id. § 2611 (4)(A)(ii). 
52 See Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
FMLA's provision for twelve weeks of unpaid leave for an employee's serious medical 
condition was not a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity), cert. granted, 535 U.S. 1075 
(U.S. May 20,2002) (No. 01-1071); Sims V. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thus did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity); Kazmier V. 
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Hale V. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(same); Chittister V. Dep't ofCmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Garrett V. Univ. 
of Ala. Bd. ofTrs., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part on other grounds, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001). But see Hibbs V. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the FMLA's provision for twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for' family member with 
serious health consideration was a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (June 24,2002) (No. 99-16321). Fora 
discussion of the availability and sufficiency of state law claims for workers who can no longer 
use federal civil rights statutes to sue their state employer in federal court, see Landau, supra, 
note 15, at 186 (discussing FMLA's application to state governments and the Supreme Court's 
recent federalism jurisprudence as well as the availability of state claims and the various 
deficiencies of those state claims). 
53 See Montgomery, 266 F.3d at 339; Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 844. 
54 See, e.g., Kimel V. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state employees 
could not seek damages from their employers for violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (holding that state employees cannot sue their 
employers for violations of Title I of the ADA). For a discussion of the FMLA and a defense of 
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soon find themselves without a damages remedy in federal court for violation of 
the FMLA. 
The Act enumerates the reasons for yvhich an employee may take FMLA 
leave. These reasons are: 
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order 
to care for such son or daughter. 
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for 
adoption or foster care. 
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the 
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health 
condition. 
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable 
to perform the functions of the position of such employee.55 
A serious health condition is defined as "an illness, injury, impairment, or 
physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, 
hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a 
health care provider.,,56 According to Department of Labor Regulations, 
continuing medical treatment includes: 
(i) A period of incapacity ... of more than three consecutive calendar days, 
and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same 
condition, that also involves: (A) Treatment two or more times by a health 
care provider ... or (B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one 
occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the 
supervision of the health care provider. 
(ii) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care. 
(iii) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a 
chronic serious health condition ... 
(iv) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a 
condition for which treatment may not be effective ... 
Congress's authority to apply the statute to the states, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001). 
55 29 U.S.c. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
56 [d. § 2611(11). See Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, Inc., 282 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 
2002) (discussing whether depression and subsequent incapacity qualified as a serious health 
condition); Slajanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv., Co., 272 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
employee's foot injury for which physician recommended surgery requiring the employee to 
miss three months of work was a serious health condition covered by the FMLA); Brannon v. 
OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding that a child who 
had a fever, was taken to a doctor, and stayed home from day care for four days, had a serious 
health condition within the requirements of FMLA). 
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(v) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments ... by a health care 
provider or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on 
referral by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an 
accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period 
of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of 
medical intervention or treatment .... 57 
An employee must give the employer thirty days notice of the need for 
leave if it is foreseeable, or else "such notice as is practicable ... 58 The employer 
may request certification by a health care provider as to the need for FMLA 
leave. 59 The certification is considered to be sufficient if it includes: "(1) the 
date on which the serious health condition commenced; (2) the probable 
duration of the condition; and (3) the appropriate medical facts within the 
knowledge of the health care provider regarding the condition ...... 60 A health 
care provider should do the certification.61 The health care provider must also 
certify that the employee is either unable to perform his or her job or needs to 
care for a family member.62 
The leave provided by the employer may be unpaid leave.63 However, the 
employer may require the employee to substitute any paid leave the employee 
has accrued for any part of the twelve-week leave period.64 If the total amount 
of paid leave available is less than twelve weeks, the remainder of the time to 
attain the twelve weeks required under the Act may be provided as unpaid 
leave. 65 
An employee may take leave for the entire twelve weeks or any part 
thereof, or on an intermittent or reduced leave schedule.66 Intermittent leave is 
57 29 C.F.R. 825.114(a) (2002). 
58 29 V.S.c. § 2612(e)(I). See Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 
1998) (holding that employee did not provide her employer adequate notice of her need for 
FMLA for her unforeseeable medical problem or condition by notifying employer of pain in her 
side and of her intent to take one day off). 
59 See 29 V.S.C. § 2613(a). 
60 Id. § 2613(b). See Bailey v. Southwest Case Co., 275 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)(finding 
that employer who requested medical certification of employee's serious medical condition did 
not interfere with the employee's FMLA rights). 
61 See id. § 2613(a). 
62 See id. § 2316(b)(4). 
63 See id. § 2612(c). 
64 See id. § 2612(d)(2). 
65 See id. § 2612(d)(I). 
66 See id. § 2612(b). 
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not available to care for a newborn or newly placed child unless the employer 
agrees to allow it.67 Intermittent leave is only available when medically 
necessary.68 The employer may request additional certification as to the need 
for intermittent leave:69 The employer may require the employee who requests 
intermittent leave to transfer to another equal position if doing so better 
accommodates the employer's needs during the time of the intermittent leave.7o 
Additionally, the employee is required to work with the employer to schedule 
leave in such a way as to avoid undue disruption of the workday.71 
An employee does not have to specifically request FMLA leave to qualify 
for leave under the Act. 72 Rather, it is the employer's responsibility to identify 
FMLA leave. 73 Courts have required the employer to timely notify the 
employee that his or her leave is FMLA leave.74 The Secretary of Labor's 
regulations implementing this portion of the Act state that if "the employer does 
not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against 
an employee's FMLA entitlement.,,75 However, the Supreme Court recently 
held that the notification is not essential unless the employee can prove that he 
or she would have acted differently had he or she known that the FMLA leave 
was counting against his or her entitlement. 76 
67 See id. § 2612(b)(I); Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 163 (lst Cir. 
1998) ("[O]ne reason for taking intermittent leave under the FMLA would be to visit the doctor 
for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, even if the employee does not take leave for such 
period in between such visits."). 
68 See id. § 2612(b)(I). 
69 See id. § 2613(5)-(7); Haggard v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 00-2648, 8 Fed.Appx. 599 
(Ark., 8th Cir. 2001) (finding that physician's note releasing employee to work half-days was 
not effective to trigger employee's FMLA right to intermittent leave because the physician's 
note did not explain the medical necessity for the leave). 
70 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(2)(B); Hatchett v. Philander Smith College, 251 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 
2001) (holding that employee who is unable to perform the essential functions of the job is not 
entitled to intermittent or reduced schedule leave under FMLA). 
71 See Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., 946 F. Supp. 988, 998 (N.D. Ga. 1996). 
72 See Lowe v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 244 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001). 
73 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (2002). 
74 See Plant v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2000). 
75 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a). 
76 See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1162 (2002) (holding that the 
Secretary of Labor's regulation requiring that leave taken by an employee does not count against 
the employee's FMLA entitlement if the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave 
was contrary to the language of the FMLA and beyond the authority of the Secretary). 
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While an employee is on FMLA leave, he or she is entitled to continued 
coverage under a group health plan.77 When the employee returns from leave, 
he or she must be restored to the position held prior to the leave, or a position 
equivalent in terms of "benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.,,78 c,' 
The FMLA makes it unlawful for employers to interfere with an 
employee's rights under the FMLA or to retaliate against an employee for 
exercising rights protected by the FMLA.79 Like the ADA, employees may 
bring a private right of action for violation of the FMLA.80 Damages include 
lost compensation (including lost wages, employment benefits or other 
compensation denied) or an amount equal to twelve weeks of compensation, 
plus interest, as well as an equal additional amount of liquidated damages and 
equitable relief (including reinstatement and promotion).81 Under the FMLA, 
a successful employee-plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, expert 
witness fees, and other costs of their lawsuit. 
When rights to leave under the FMLA and ADA apply simultaneously, the 
statute providing greater protection to the employee controls.82 Unfortunately, 
making a determination as to which statute provides greater protection to an 
employee rarely proves to be an easy task. For example, the FMLA limits the 
employee's leave period to twelve weeks, while the ADA contains an "undue 
hardship" defense to its reasonable accommodation requirement.83 Depending 
on an employer's financial situation, it may be that the FMLA provides more 
protection because the employer may be able to demonstrate that twelve weeks 
of unpaid leave is an undue hardship. Thus, the issue always exists that one of 
the statutes may provide more protection in a particular situation than in 
77 See 29 U.S,C. § 2614(1) (2000). 
78 [d. § 2614(a)( 1). See Mary Jean Geroul0, The Family Medical Leave Act: Reinstatement 
Following Leave: How to Cope From an Employer's Perspective, 2 Hous. Bus. TAX J. 51 
(2002) (noting problems for employer with FMLA's statutory language and potential broad 
scope). 
79 See 29 U.S.c. § 2615(a);(b). See Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that employee who, while on FMLA had received an incident report which specifically listed 
unpaid leave as a problem, stated a valid FMLA claim for retaliation). 
80 See 29 U.S.c. § 2617(a). 
81 See id. § 2617(a)(I), (a)(ll). 
82 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (2002) (stating that "[a]n employer must therefore provide 
leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees"). 
83 See Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp. ofR.!., 168 F.3d 538,544 (lst Cir. 1999) (stating that "it is 
not at all clear that the concept of 'reasonable accommodation' is appropriate in' the FMLA 
context"). 
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another, and the amount of protection will depend greatly on the facts of each 
specific case and cannot be generalized across employers and employees. 84 
C. Workers' Compensation 
Workers' compensation programs are run by the states, but are primarily 
based on the same model. 85 Workers' compensation is a no-fault system that is 
usually the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries.86 This means that 
employees do not have to prove that the employer was at fault for the injury 
sustained by the employee,87 but the employee may not sue the employer for 
any other benefits if the employee receives workers' compensation.88 It 
represents a balance between the economic interests of the employer and the 
health and safety interests of the employee.89 
84 See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). 
85 See OHIO CONST. art. II § 35 (providing for Ohio's workers' compensation system); Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.340 (Michie 2002) (mandating that all employers provide workers' 
compensation); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.650 (Michie 2002) (listing the few exceptions of 
which employees are not covered by workers' compensation); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 
(Anderson 2001) (defining covered employers and employees); MODERN WORKERS 
COMPENSATION § 100:1 (West 2002); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW vol. 2, at 
§ 6.1, 6.2 (2d ed. West 1999). 
86 See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 
100.01 (Matthew Bender 2002); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.3,6.7. 
87 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011 (Michie 2002) (providing defmition of injury for 
workers'compensation claim and requirement that injury be work-related); Knott County 
Nursing Home v. Wallen, 74 S.W.3d 706 (Ky. 2002); Hayes v. Gibson Hart Co., 789 S.W.2d 
775,775-76 (Ky. 1990); LARSON, supra note 86, § 1.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, 
supra note 85, § 100:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.3, 6.7. 
88 See LARSON, supra note 86, § 1.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 
102: 1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.3, 6.8. 
89 Some scholars disagree as to whether the appropriate balance has been struck with respect 
to protecting employees' health and safety. See Terry Thomason et al., Workers' 
Compensation: Benefits, Costs and Safety Under Alternative Insurance Arrangements (W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ed., 2001); Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic 
Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, 
Antitrust, Intellectual 'Property and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. (2002); Jason M. Solomon, Note, Fulfilling the Bargain: How One Science of 
Ergonomics Can Inform the Laws of Workers' Compensation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1140 
(2001); Barbara Baum Levine & James M. McCarthy, Gradual Changes Have Silently 
Transformed the Adjudication of Women's Compensation Claims, 74 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 40 
(2002). 
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In most states, all private and most public employees are covered by 
workers' compensation, with few exceptions.90 Covered employers include all 
employers with one or more employee, although in some states a larger number 
of employees is required in order to be a covered employer under workers' 
compensation statutes.91 Workers' compensation statutes generally apply to 
accidental injuries that occur on the job.92 However, coverage is limited to 
injuries that "arise out of,93 and "in the course of' the employment 
relationship.94 The "arising out of' requirement refers to the underlying cause 
of the injury,95 whereas the "in the course of' requirement refers to the time, 
location, and conditions of the injury.96 Preexisting injuries that are aggravated 
and accelerated by work conditions may also be covered.97 
Covered injuries include traumatic injuries,98 as well as occupational 
. . . 99 
exposure lDJunes. 
90 See OHIO CONST. art. II. § 35 (providing for Ohio's workers' compensation system); Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.340 (Michie 2002) (mandating that all employers provide workers' 
compensation); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.650 (Michie 2002) (listing the few exceptions of 
which employees are not covered by workers' compensation); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 
(Anderson 2001) (defining covered employers and employees); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 
6.4,6.8. 
91 See Meredith v. Jefferson County Prop. Valuation Adm'r, 19 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Ky. 
2000); Seventh St. Rd. Tobacco Warehouse v. Stillwell, 550 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Ky. 1976);' 
MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 105:6; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.4, 
6.9. 
92 See Meredith, 19 S.W.3d at 108; LARSON, supra note 86, § 42.01; MODERN WORKERS 
COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 108:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.3, 6.7. 
93 See McNutt Constr. v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Ky. 2001); LARSON, supra note 86, § 
3.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 110:4; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 
6.14,6.57-.58. 
94 See Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. 2001); LARSON, supra note 86, § 
3.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 110:5; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 
6.6,6.24. 
95 See McKenzie v. Whayne Supply Co., 898 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky. 1995); LARSON, supra 
note 86, § 3.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 110:4; ROTHSTEIN, supra 
note 85, § 6.14, 6.57-58. 
96 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.185 (Michie 2002); Newberg v. Slone; 846S.W.2d694, 
695 (Ky. 1995); LARSON, supra note 86, § 3.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 
85, § 110:5; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.6, 6.24. 
97 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.185; Alcan Foil Prods. v. Huff, 2 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Ky. 
1999); Special Fund v. Clark., 998 S.W.2d 487,489-90 (Ky. 1999); LARSON, supra note 86, § 
9.02; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.20, 6.74-.75. 
98 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 108: 1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, 
§§ 6.3, 6.7. 
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The employee has an obligation to notify the employer as soon as 
practicable after the injury has occurred, 100 and failure to do so may result in the 
employee being ineligible for benefits. 101 The system is self-executing, in that 
as soon as the employer receives notice that the employee has a temporary 
disability, $e employer must begin paying benefits without legal or 
administrative intervention. 102 
There are several different types of benefits that employees may be eligible 
to receive, including medical care,103 disability payments,l04 vocational 
rehabilitation,105 and death benefits. 106 The employee is entitled to full payment 
of all reasonable medical bills for the treatment of the work-related injury. 107 
An employee who misses some statutorily defined number of days of work is 
also eligible for temporary total disability payments,108 which continues until 
either he or she is able to return to work or the injury is considered 
permanent. 109 A person who is able to work, but not at the same capacity as 
99 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.020; Adkins v. R & S Body Co., 58 S.W.3d 428, 430 
(Ky. 2000); LARSON, supra note 86, § 42.03; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 
85, § 109:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, at §§ 6.24, 6.99. 
100 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(1); LARSON, supra note 86, § 126.01; ROTHSTEIN, 
supra note 85, §§ 6.27,6.121. 
101 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.710(3); Haddock v. Hopkinsville Coating Corp., 62 
S.W.3d 387, 391 (Ky. 2002); Wilson v. SKW Alloys, 893 S.W.2d 800, 801-02 (Ky. 1995); 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.27, 6.121. 
102 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.730(3), 750; Brusman v. Newport Steel Corp., 17 
S.W.3d 514, 515 (Ky. 2000); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.27, 6.121. 
103 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.020; Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Porter, 469 
S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ky. 1971); LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.01; MODERN WORKERS 
COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 202:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.27, 6.120-21. 
104 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(1)(a); LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.01; ROTHSTEIN, 
supra note 85, §§ 6.27, 6.120-21. 
105 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(1); LARSON, supra note 86, § 95.01; MODERN 
WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.132. 
106 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.730; Clemco Fabricators v. Becker, 62 S.W.3d 396, 397-
98 (Ky. 2002) (holding that no provision for temporary disability exists under Kentucky Law); 
LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.01; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.32, 6.146. 
107 See Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree, 966 S.W.2d 951,955 (Ky. 1998); ROTHSTEIN,sUpra note 85, 
§§ 6.27, 6.120. 
108 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.730; Paducah v. Green, 260 S.w.2d 938,938-39 (Ky. 
1953); LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.03 [6]; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 
200:45; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.124; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAWS, Table 14, at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/statutes/owcp/stwclaw/tables-
pdf/table-14.pdf(last visited July 11,2002). 
109 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.125; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra 
note 85, § 200:31. See also LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.03[2]. 
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before the injury, may be eligible for temporary partial disability.11O The 
purpose of disability benefits is to offset lost wages resulting from an inability 
to work. 111 
An employee is eligible to receive temporary disability payments while 
being treated for and recovering from an employment injury.112 The employer 
is usually not obligated to continue paying these disability payments after a 
person has reached maximum medical improvement. 113 At that time, if the 
effects of the injury persist, the employee may be eligible for permanent, partial 
or total disability payments. 114 An employer may offer an injured employee a 
comparable job, and if the employee either takes the job or declines the job, the 
employer may terminate the benefits. I 15 If an employee who has reached 
maximum medical improvement fails to seek employment, the employer may 
discontinue disability benefits. I 16 Some states also provide for vocational 
rehabilitation to return an injured employee to some other gainful 
employment. 117 If the employee is unable to return to work when he or she has 
reached maximum medical improvement, in some states the employer may 
terminate the employee. I 18 
II. THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING LEAVES OF ABSENCE AND RETURNS 
To WORK 
A. Leave of Absence 
An employee with an injury or illness may require time away from work. 
An employer, in order to serve his or her economic interests, must know 
110 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.730; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, 
§ 200:7. 
III See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200: 1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
85, §§ 6.28, 6.124. 
112 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.125. 
113 See id. §§ 6.28, 6.125. 
114 See id.; LARSON, supra note 86, § 80.04; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 
85, § 200:9. 
115 See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200:31-32; ROTHSTEIN, supra 
note 85, §§ 6.28,6.127. 
116 See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200:34; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
85, §§6.28, 6.128. 
117 See LARSON, supra note 86, § 95.01; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, 
§ 200:1; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.132. 
118 9 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.39, 6.1 0-91. 
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whether or not an employee is entitled to the leave of absence he or she 
requests. This requires an ability to understand and implement the ADA, the 
FMLA, and workers' compensation statutes simultaneously. 
An employee's right to leave is probably most protected by the FMLA, 
because it guarantees covered employees twelve weeks unpaid leave during 
each twelve month time period. However, the courts have limited the 
protection that employees receive under the FMLA by interpreting it strongly in 
favor of the employer. "9 For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently held that the FMLA does not permit unpredictable absences 
throughout the career, because this would prevent the employee from being 
able to perform the essential functions of his or her job. '2o The Eighth Circuit 
has also held that an employer may fIre an employee for excessive absences if 
some of the unexcused absences were not FMLA protected. 121 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an employee has an obligation to provide 
notice if possible, and that if the employee fails to give timely notice, the leave 
will not be protected from an automatic termination policy.'22 The Eighth 
Circuit also has allowed an employer to fIre an employee under an automatic 
termination policy because the employee was unable to perform the essential 
functions of the job at the end of the twelve weeks of leave. 123 In addition, if an 
employee cannot meet the elements necessary to prove that his or her leave is 
FMLA protected, he or she can be discharged under a no-fault policy. 124 
Nonetheless, an employer may not discharge an employee for legitimately 
using the twelve weeks of FMLA leave. If an employee who takes FMLA 
protected leave is discharged, and the employer can offer no other explanation 
for the discharge than excessive absenteeism, the discharge is properly 
119 See Erin Gielow, Note, Equality Is the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 
S. CAL. L. REv. 1529 (2002); Richard Bales & Sarah Nefzger, Employer Notice Requirements 
Under the Family Medical Leave Act, 67 Mo. L. REv. 883 (2002); Leading Cases, Family 
Medical Leave Act, 116 HARv. L. REv. 362 (2002). But see Geroul0, supra note 78. 
120 See Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 
2002). See also Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp., 272 F.3d 1006, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001). 
121 See Bailey v. Amsted Indus., 172 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Morgan v. 
Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997). 
122 See Gilliam v. United Parcel Serv., 233 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2000). 
123 See Reynolds v. Phillips & Temro, Inc., 195 F.3d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1999). 
124 See Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109, 1113 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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considered retaliatory. 125 In that case, the employee can receive lost wages and 
other lost benefits as well as her attorney's fees. 126 
The FMLA also allows employees to take the twelve weeks of leave on an 
intermittent or reduced schedule basis. 127 Intermittent or reduced schedule 
leave is taken in brief time blocks, rather than one continuous period of time, 
and may include leave from one hour to several weeks. 128 In order to qualify 
for intermittent or reduced schedule leave, an employee must be able to perform 
the essential functions of the job while there. 129 Intermittent leave must be 
medically necessary for a serious health condition. 13o The employee is also 
required to work with the employer to avoid undue disruption of the 
workday. 131 
Although the FMLA provides the most protection to a worker needing a 
leave of absence, the ADA policies on leaves of absence may be more 
generous. When an employee needs a leave of absence to recuperate, it may be 
a reasonable accommodation. 132 The ADA does not specify a specific limit on 
the length of a leave of absence; rather, the limit is based on whether the leave 
requested would be an undue hardship to the employer. 133 In fact, a leave of 
absence may be considered a reasonable accommodation even when it is not 
certain or even likely to successfully improve the employee's condition, as long 
as it could plausibly allow the employee to return to work. 134 If an employer 
fires an employee shortly after he or she requests a leave of absence, this may 
show that the employer has failed to reasonably accommodate the employee. 135 
There are, on the other hand, significant limitations imposed by the courts 
on the use of leaves of absence under the ADA. For instance, courts have 
found that working full time is probably an essential function of a full time 
125 See Bryant v. Delbar Prod., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799,809 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
126 See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)-(a)(Il) (2000). 
127 See id. § 2612(b). 
128 See Barron v. Runyon, 205 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 2000). 
129 See Hatchett v. Philander Smith ColI., 251 F.3d 670, 676 (8th Cir. 2001); Reynolds v. 
Phillips & Temro Indus., Inc., 195 F.3d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1999). 
130 See Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., 946 F. Supp. 988, 998 (N.D. Ga 1996). 
131 See id. 
132 See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998). 
133 See Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, Inc., 155 F.3d 775, 782-83 
(6th Cir. 1998). 
134 See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). 
135 See Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 601. 
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job. 136 As such, unlimited sick days are not considered a reasonable 
accommodation. 137 Likewise, an indefinite period of leave may not be 
considered a reasonable accommodation. 138 Businesses are not obligated to 
tolerate erratic unreliable attendance, because this would be disruptive to the 
work environment. 139 Additionally, when the accommodation has no 
reasonable prospect of allowing the employee to return to work in the 
identifiable future, an extended leave of absence is not a reasonable 
accommodation. 140 Even if a leave of absence may be all that an employee 
needs to resume working, courts have held that attendance is an essential 
function of some jobs. 141 In these cases, extended leave may not be considered 
a reasonable accommodation. 142 When attendance is an essential function, an 
employer may discharge a disabled employee for excessive absences if a 
reasonable accommodation will not enable the employee to attain regular 
attendance. 143 The Sixth Circuit has even held that when a company applies a 
uniform absence policy, this does not violate the ADA. 144 However, some 
courts have cautioned that there should be no presumption that attendance is an 
essential function. 145 Instead, the court should consider whether a leave of 
absence would place an undue hardship on the employer. 146 
An employee may also be entitled to a leave of absence under state 
workers' compensation legislation. In fact, workers' compensation benefits 
usually begin after a certain statutorily defined period of absence resulting from 
a work related injury. 147 When the benefits begin, the injured employee is 
usually entitled to continue receiving the benefits until he or she has reached 
maximum ~edical improvement, or is able to return to work. 148 Workers' 
compensation is less protective of employees' rights to leave, though, because it 
136 See e.g. DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2001). 
137 See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 2001). 
138 See Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477,481 (5th Cir. 2000). 
139 See Yellow Freight System, 253 F.3d at 950. 
140 See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000). 
141 See, e.g., Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 927-29 (7th Cir. 2001). 
142 See id. 
143 See Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1998). 
144 See Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods, 143 F.3d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1998). 
145 See Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., Inc., 155 F.3d 775, 782-83 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
146 See id. 
147 See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200:45; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
85, §§ 6.28, 6.124. 
148 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.28, 6.125. 
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often pennits an employer to require the employee to return to a light duty 
job,149 or undergo vocational rehabilitation instead of continuing the leave of 
absence. 150 When an employer does not provide these options to an employee, 
the employee who has reached maximum medical improvement still has an 
obligation to seek employment elsewhere in order to continue receiving 
disability benefits. 151 In addition, if an employee is unable to return to work 
when he or she has reached maximum medical improvement, the employer may 
be pennitted to tenninate the employee. 152 
An employer must be careful when implementing these policies 
simultaneously. The employer must observe the law that provides the greatest 
protection to its employees in the circumstances presented. 153 When an 
employee's qualifying disability is also a serious medical condition, an 
employer covered under the FMLA is required to provide the employee with 
the twelve weeks of leave to which he is entitled under that statute, without 
consideration of whether the leave is an undue hardship under the ADA. 154 If 
an employee requests a reasonable leave of absence longer than twelve weeks, 
and it is not an undue hardship for the employer to provide it, the employer 
must pennit the leave under the ADA. However, not all serious health 
conditions are considered a disability, so an employee may not be entitled to 
more than the twelve weeks of leave pennitted under the FMLA. Any leave 
taken under the ADA may be considered to have run concurrently with FMLA 
leave. An employer may also consider any leave taken under a workers' 
compensation claim as FMLA leave. 
An employer may have more difficulty implementing the ADA and 
workers' compensation claims simultaneously. Some things that employees are 
pennitted to do under most workers' compensation statutes are not pennitted 
under the ADA. For instance, most workers' compensation statutes pennit an 
employer to provide light duty work or vocational rehabilitation for injured 
employees to help them return to work more quickly, whereas under the ADA, 
the employee may be entitled to continue a leave of absence instead of taking 
149 See id. §§ 6.28, 6.127. 
150 See id. §§ 6.28, 6.132; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 203:1. 
151 See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 85, § 200:34; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
85, §§ 6.28, 6.27-.28. 
152 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, §§ 6.39, 6.190-.91. 
153 See 29 C.F.R § 825.702(a) (2002). 
154 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 25.702(a) (2002) (if an employer is covered by more than one statute, 
the employer is obligated to follow the law that provides the most protection to the employee). 
See also www.eeoc.gov/docs/frnlaada.txt. 
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another position because the ADA prefers accommodation in the current job 
over reassignment to another job. 155 In addition, some employers have a 100 
percent healed policy with regard to employees receiving workers' 
compensation benefits, which is a per se violation of the ADA. 156 An employer 
must allow an employee who is able to perform the essential functions of ajob, 
with or without reasonable accommodations, to return to work. 
B. Returns to Work 
When an employee is ready to return to work after leave time, the situation 
is no less troubling for an employer. The return-to-work requirements are 
different under the FMLA and the ADA, and those requirements may conflict 
with policies the employer has in place for returning-to-the-job injured workers 
who are receiving workers' compensation benefits. 
Under the FMLA, the employer has an obligation to reinstate the employee 
to the same or similar job. 157 The position must be the same in terms of pay, 
benefits, and status. 158 If the employee has more FMLA time available, the 
employee may choose to return to work on an intermittent leave schedule. 159 If 
the employee elects to do this, he or she must provide certification that the 
intermittent leave is medically necessary.160 In addition, the employee must 
attempt to schedule the periods of leave during mutually convenient times. 161 
The employer may move the employee to a different equal position during the 
reduced schedule leave time if it is more convenient for the eJ;llployer. 162 In 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a) ("reasonable accommodation" may include "reassignment to 
vacant position"); 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(0); U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,406 
(2002) (holding that the ADA does not ordainarily require assignment when such reassignment 
would violate an established seniority plan); Stephen F. Belfont, The Most Difficult ADA 
Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leaves of Absense, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 439 (2002). 
156 See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., 883 F. Supp. 379, 396 (D. Iowa 1995); Heise v. 
Genuine Parts Co., 100 F. Supp. 1137, 1154 n.1O (D. Minn. 1995). 
157 See 29 U.S.c. § 2614(a)(l) (2000); Gunderson v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., 982 F. 
Supp. 1231, 1238 (N.D. Tex. 1997). See also Geroulo, supra note 78, at 52. 
158 See Gunderson, 982 F. Supp. at 1238. 
159 See 29 U.S.c. § 2612(d)(l). 
160 See id. § 2613(5)-(7). 
161 See Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., 946 F. Supp. 988, 998 (N.D. Ga. 1996). 
162 See 29 U.S.c. § 2612(2)(B). 
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order to qualify for intermittent leave, the employee must be able to perform the 
essential functions of the job while he or she is there. 163 
Under the ADA, an employee who is disabled may request a reasonable 
accommodation when returning to work, which may include a light duty 
assignment, intermittent leave, or reassignment. 164 Although the employer has 
an obligation to attempt to provide an accommodation, the employer is not 
required to create a new position for an employee. 165 Thus, in order to be 
considered a reasonable accommodation, the employee must be able to perform 
the essential functions of a currently existing position. 
Courts have further restricted an employer's duty with respect to a disabled 
worker's accommodation requests. For instance, it has been held that working 
full time is an essential function of a full time job. 166 This significantly limits 
the accommodations available to some employees, as an employer is under no 
duty to allow a person to work part time if there are no part time positions 
available. 167 It has also been held that unlimited sick days are not a reasonable 
accommodation. 168 This is because businesses are not obligated to tolerate 
erratic unreliable attendance, as this would be disruptive to the work 
environment. 169 
An employee who cannot be accommodated in his or her current position 
may be reassigned to a different position. Reassignment is only considered a 
viable accommodation when accommodation in the current position would 
constitute undue hardship.17o Reasonable accommodation may include 
reassignment to any position that is currently vacant or that may become vacant 
in the fairly immediate future. 171 When determining whether he or she is able 
to accommodate a disabled employee through reassignment, the employer must 
163 See Hatchett v. Philander Smith Coil., 251 F.3d 670,676 (8th Cir. 2001). 
164 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.20. 
165 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,1174 (lOth Cir. 1999); Monette v. 
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173,1187 (6th Cir. 1996). 
166 See DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2001). 
167 See Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 Fed. Appx. 49 (4th Cir. April 3, 2002). 
168 See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943,950 (7th Cir. 2001). 
169 See id. 
170 See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1170; Skerski v. Time WarnerComm. Co., 257 F.3d 273, 285 (3d 
Cir.2001). 
171 See Boykin v. ATCNanCom of Col., 247 F.3d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001); Dalton v. 
Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1174-75 (10th 
Cir. 1999). 
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consider all available positions. 172 However, if there are no positions currently 
available, the employer is not required to retain the employee indefinitely while 
waiting for a position to become available. 173 An employer only has to reassign 
a person to a position for which he or she is qualified l74 and does not have to 
consider positions that would be considered promotions. 175 The reassignment 
may be to a position that is considered to be a demotion 176 if the employer first 
considers lateral moves.177 
Reassignment to a light duty position is an acceptable accommodation. 178 
Although an employer must accommodate an employee with a light duty 
position if it is reasonable and a position is available, an employer has no duty 
to remove another employee from a position to make one available for the 
disabled employee. 179 This includes even temporary workers. 180 An employer 
does not have to allow a disabled person to permanently assume a previously 
temporary position 181 because it would frustrate the purpose of temporary light 
duty positions to allow permanently impaired employees to fill them. 182 An 
employer does not have to allow a disabled employee to assume a position that 
has traditionally been a rotating-type job, either, because that would essentially 
require the creation of a new position. 183 
Recently, the Supreme Court considered reassignment with respect to a 
seniority system. l84 The Court held that an employer was not required to 
reassign a disabled employee to a position as an accommodation if, under the 
employer's seniority system, other employees were entitled to that position. 185 
The seniority system need not be part of a collective bargaining agreement but 
must have been uniformly applied without multiple exceptions in order to 
172 See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Hendricks-
Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998). 
173 See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996). 
174 See Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677; Smith, 180 F.3d at 1178. 
175 See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176. 
176 See Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678. 
177 See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1177. 
178 See Dalton, 141 F.3d at 680. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998). 
183 See Hoskins v. Oakland City Sherriff's Dept., 227 F.3d 719,730 (6th Cir. 2000). 
184 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1519 (2002). 
185 See id. at 1520. 
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trump an employee's ADA reasonable accommodation claim. 186 Lower courts 
have also held that an employee is not required to make a reassignment that 
would violate another employee's rights under a collective bargain 
agreement. 187 An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 
opinion letter states that: 
when an employer seeks to provide a reasonable accommodation that 
conflicts with collectively bargained seniority rules, the Commission's 
position is that the substance of a union's reasonable accommodation 
obligation is to negotiate with the employer to provide a variance to the 
collective bargaining agreement, if no other reasonable accommodation 
exists and the proposed accommodation does not unduly burden non-
disabled workers or otherwise pose an undue hardship. 188 
Courts have extended this position to provide that an employer does not 
have to violate any reasonable non-discriminatory policy supporting legitimate 
business interests in accommodating a disabled employee. 189 
m. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS To THE OVERLAPPING RULES 
Workers' compensation costs have increased dramatically over the last 
several decades,190 and many continue to advocate change even though states 
have acted to reform their systems in order to contain costs. 191 Recent federal 
legislation meant to protect workers seemingly adds to the costs of workers' 
compensation because now employers must implement the FMLA concurrently 
with workers' compensation programs and consider the ADA as they hire new 
workers or attempt to return previously injured employees to work. Some 
suggest that the ADA and the FMLA undermine the exclusive remedy 
provisions of workers' compensation, thereby increasing the costs of workers' 
compensation for employers. 192 Many employers are frustrated with both the 
186 See id. at 1519. 
187 See Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 634 (6th Cir. 1999). 
188 EEOC Opinion Letter on ADA Confidentiality Requirements and Union Rights (Nov. 1, 
1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/nlrblet.html (last visited July 28, 2002). 
189 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175-76 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
190 See H. Allan Hunt & Rochelle V. Habeck, New Hope for Workers' Compensation 
Programs, Employment Research, available at 
http://www.upjohninst.orglpublications/newsletterlhah_f94. pdf (Fall 1994). 
191 See, e.g., Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is 
Federal Refonn the Answer?, 34 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 1083, 1111 (Winter 1999). 
192 See Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: 
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increased costs of the administrative efforts to implement these intertwined 
programs, as well as the increased costs arising directly from them. As a result, 
scholars have suggested drastic reform, such as federalizing workers' 
compensation, modifying the definition of disability, I 93 or increasing 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulation. 
The goal of workers' compensation is to benefit both the employer and the 
employee by providing guaranteed remedies for the employee while avoiding 
the expense of litigation for the employer by keeping the entire process within 
the administrative system. 194 Scholars who suggest federalizing the workers' 
compensation system argue that to do so would restore "uniformity, efficiency, 
fairness, and predictability" in the workers' compensation system,195 while 
making it easier to administer the ADA and the FMLA in conjunction with 
workers' compensation. 196 While these are important goals with respect to 
reforming workers' compensation, a federal workers' compensation system is 
nonetheless impractical. Even if it were practical, it would not eliminate the 
difficulties in the implementation of the ADA and the FMLA with workers' 
compensation. 
Traditionally, states have been responsible for providing for the health and 
welfare of their citizens under the state police power. This is a power states 
would be unlikely to allow the federal government to usurp in the 
administration of a workers' compensation program. In addition, workers' 
compensation systems reflect the market of the area in which they exist. The 
differences in the compensation provided in each state are thus justified by 
market differences. 197 A federal system would be less responsive to such 
market differences. Furthermore, a federal system would stifle innovation. 
Competition between the states has already led to decreased fraud, improved 
claims management, and the rise of managed care to help control costs and 
.. d k 198 ensure proper payments to lllJure wor ers. 
An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. Bus. L. J. 403, 422 (Spring 1998). 
193 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein et aI., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define 
Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 243 
(2002); Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure 
of the "Disability" Definition of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. 
REV.1405 (1999); Gabel, supra note 191, at 1111. 
194 See Gabel, supra note 192, at 407. 
195 See Gabel, supra note 191, at 1111. 
196 See id., at 1120. 
197 See DANIEL MONT ET AL., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2000 NEW ESTIMATES 22 (June 2002). 
198 See Gabel, supra note 192, at 435-36; Jordan H. Leibman & Terry Morehead Dworkin, 
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In addition, adopting a federal workers' compensation would probably not 
be effective in containing employers' costs. While employers' costs reached an 
all time high in the early part of the 1990s, 199 reform at the state level has led to 
a decline in the trend, and even some significant decreases in costs for 
employers.200 These changes in the costs of workers' compensation have 
occurred for a multitude of reasons. The incidence rate of injuries involving 
days away from work has decreased or remained steady every year since 
1992.201 Cases involving the payment of benefits for missed work make up 
only twenty-four percent of the total number of workers' compensation cases, 
but amount to ninety-four percent of all benefits paid,202 such that the incidence 
rate of these more serious injuries significantly affects the overall cost of 
workers' compensation. In 2000, more than forty-four percent of benefits paid 
were medical benefits.203 This is a high percentage in comparison to the last 
several decades,204 which suggests employees are experiencing fewer missed 
days per injury, or are receiving less cash benefits for missed work. 
The states acted quickly and accurately to contain the rising costs of which 
employers complained. A federal system would take longer to react to the need 
for change. At the state level, employers pay for the entire workers' 
compensation system. Eighty-two percent of the total employer costs are 
benefits paid.205 Administrative costs and insurance profits make up the other 
eighteen percent of employers' costS.206 A federal system would probably not 
be this efficient. 
Even if a federal system was adopted, it would not eliminate the difficulties 
in the implementation of the ADA and the FMLA with workers' compensation. 
For the employer and the employee both, the most basic purpose of the 
workers' compensation is to decrease loss by appropriately providing for the 
needs of an employee after an injury so that he or she may return to work as 
expediently as possible. Workers' compensation is a risk minimization 
program for both the employer and the employee. It has been suggested that 
Time Limitations Under State Occupational Disease Acts, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 289, 363 (Jan. 
1985). 
199 See MONTET AL., supra note 197, at 22. 
200 In 1992, benefits per $100 of payroll were $1.68, while in 2000, they were thirty-eight 
percent lower at $1.03. See MONT, supra note 197, at 24. 
201 See MONT, supra note 197, at 26. 
202 See id. at 27. 
203 See id. at 13. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. at 24. 
206 See id. 
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the ADA and workers' compensation conflict because the ADA focuses on how 
much a person can do, while workers' compensation statutes focus significantly 
on a person's loss of functional capacity.207 However, the ADA is actually 
similar to workers' compensation in that its purpose is to assist as many 
disabled individuals as possible to attain gainful employment. 
This misses the much bigger point, though, which is that comparing 
workers' compensation to the ADA is like comparing apples to oranges. The 
ADA is legislation against discrimination, and to whatever extent that it 
disrupts the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation statutes, it 
will continue to do so whether the statutes are state statutes or federal statutes. 
This is not a conflict that can be altered, because it is not a conflict at all. As 
Professor Ranko Shiraki Oliver has pointed out, a charge of disability 
discrimination is not inconsistent with exclusive remedy provisions because it is 
not seeking additional recovery for an injury.208 Rather, it is a request for 
recovery from an employer's failure to comply with discrimination 
1 . l' 209 egIs anon. 
Although the ultimate goals of the two programs are not conflicting, they 
may have conflicting requirements. Employers are often permitted to have a 
policy requiring an employee to be completely healed before returning to work 
under a workers' compensation program, whereas under the ADA, this is an 
impermissible requirement. 210 This is the functional equivalent of refusing to 
employ the person because of his or her disability. An employee who recovers 
damages because his employer has discriminated against him has done nothing 
to upset the workers' compensation system. It is unlikely that it would not 
change in a federal system. 
Although proponents present similar arguments with respect to the FMLA, 
the arguments do not seem to be that the FMLA adds significant costs to 
workers' compensation.211 Rather, the arguments seem to be that the FMLA is 
difficult to administer in general, and that employers do not like the benefits it 
provides to employees.212 For instance, one argument is that it makes it 
difficult for employers to get employees to come back to work, because an 
207 See Gabel, supra note 191, at 1098. 
208 See Ranko Shiraki Oliver, The Impact of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 on Workers' Compensation Law, 16 U. ARK. LITILERoCKL.J. 327, 370 (1994). 
209 See id. at 371. 
210 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.20. 
211 See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 192, at 422-27. 
212 See Geroulo, supra note 78, at 55; Gabel, supra note 192, at 422-27. 
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employee who has been cleared for work by the workers' compensation 
physician may seek a second opinion by his or her own physician.213 If his or 
her own physician certifies that the employee has a serious health condition, the 
employee may remain on leave. However, at this time, the employer may still 
terminate the workers' compensation benefits and put the employee on the 
unpaid leave to which he is entitled. It is doubtful that in federalizing a 
workers' compensation program, Congress also would decide to rewrite the 
benefits provided under the FMLA, and yet, that seems to be the only way that 
these so-called problems between workers' compensation programs and the 
FMLA could be solved. 
It is doubtful that a federal workers' compensation system would alleviate 
any of the problems related to the implementation of these three pieces of 
legislation. The ADA and the FMLA continue to offer benefits to employees at 
the expense of employers, of which employers are not likely to appreciate the 
full value. And they will still have to be implemented simultaneously with 
workers' compensation whether it is a state or federal program. Finally, it is 
probably a program most appropriately provided by the states. 
Although a federal workers' compensation system would not likely benefit 
the employee or the employer, increased regulation by OSHA may in fact ease 
pressures within the workers' compensation system. The purpose of the OSHA 
is to provide a safe work environment by providing regulations regarding the 
health and safety of employees.214 Currently, however, OSHA is under-funded, 
understaffed, and overextended.215 As a result, OSHA has been unable to make 
widespread efforts to abate workplace dangers. Instead, OSHA has targeted 
particularly dangerous occupations for regulation and inspection activity.216 In 
these particularly dangerous occupations, it seems OSHA activity has led to a 
decrease in the incidence of workplace injury.217 This suggests that if OSHA 
were given the funding and manpower to extend its activities more generally to 
all work environments, the incidence of workplace injury would also generally 
213 See Gabel, supra note 192, at 426. 
214 See 29 V.S.c. § 651(b) (2000). 
215 See Sidney Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory 
and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 97, 98-99 (Winter 2000). 
216 See Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel 
Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L. Soc. REV. 177, 184 (1993). 
217 See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Refonn, 
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 597 (Fall 1996). 
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decline. As the rate of injury decreases, workers' compensation costs probably 
also decrease.218 
Some argue that the costs associated with workers' compensation are the 
only incentive employers need to provide workplace safety, such that OSHA 
involvement is unnecessary.219 However, studies show that, for a multitude of 
reasons, workers' compensation costs are not an effective incentive to an 
employer to improve workplace conditions.22o Often, workers' compensation 
benefits paid to injured workers are lower than the actual damages they have 
incurred.221 In addition, the insurance premiums firms pay, particularly small 
firms, do not accurately reflect their claims experience, because insurance 
companies do not charge smaller firms based on their history of injury. 222 For 
these reasons, the costs of workers' compensation are lower than the costs 
associated with abating injury, and so there is no incentive to attempt to prevent 
workplace injuries.223 However, if there were appropriate fines attached to 
failing to adopt policies and provide equipment most effective in protecting the 
health and safety of employees, there would be greater incentive to comply, 
because the total cost of abatement would then be less than the cost of the 
injuries sustained by employees.224 The only way that this incentive could ever 
be realized would be to increase OSHA's ability to have "a direct, substantial, 
and continuing presence" in industry by increasing its resources.225 
It has also been suggested that modifying the ADA's definition of disability 
in order to "create conceptual clarity to disentangle the ... policies, so that they 
are viewed as serving different groups," might help reconcile the ADA with 
other benefits programs,z26 Moreover, the different definition may help to 
provide much needed clarity to the employees, employers and, in particular, to 
218 For example, the incidence rate of workplace injuries and illnesses has steadily declined 
between 1993 and 2000. During this same time period, employer costs fell from 2.16% of 
payroll to just 1.25%. See MONT ET AL., supra note 197, at 25. 
219 See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 217, at 599. 
220 See id. at 601. 
221 See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 215, at 105. See also McGarity & Shapiro, supra 
note 217, at 599. 
222 See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 215, at 106. 
223 See McGarity &. Shapiro, supra note 217, at 602. 
224 S ee Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 215, at 101. 
225 McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 217, at 608. 
226 Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1003, 1033-55 
(April 1998). 
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the courts. 227 Different scholars have suggested a variety of different ways to 
amend the definition of disability. 228 Professor Matthew Diller, however points 
out that many of these scholars have the goal of creating a system in which a 
person is only entitled to the benefits of one statute at a time.229 Thus, a person 
who is injured under workers' compensation would not also be considered 
disabled under the ADA. This method reduces some of the confusion and 
uncertainty involved in the administration of these rorograrns because it seeks to 
separate workers into mutually exclusive groupS.2. 0 
Although a new definition of disability under the ADA would significantly 
decrease the effort involved.in administering the statutes and provide a much 
needed clarity, it is not sound to believe that it would create a system where 
individuals are entitled to only disability benefits under one statute for 
workplace injuries and illnesses. As Professor Diller pointed out, this approach 
ignores the social situation of many people who seek the benefits of multiple 
public programs.23I In addition, it tends to ignore the varying goals of the 
different policies. A person who is injured on the job and receives benefits 
under workers' compensation may still experience stigmatization when he or 
she attempts to return to the workforce. This person still needs the protection of 
the ADA, and to change the definition of disability to one that does not include 
the worker would be a disservice to all but the employer who wishes to 
discriminate. 
This idea is closely tied to a current phenomenon observable in dual-
benefits litigation: judicial estoppel. This occurs when courts perceive that the 
tensions between two different benefits programs prohibit a person from 
qualifying for benefits under both programs.232 The Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of estoppel in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems.233 The Court 
found that "there are ... many situations in which a social security disability 
227 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A 
Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 243 (2002). 
228 See Diller, supra note 226, at 1033-55; Rothstein et al., supra note 227, at 269-75. 
229 See Diller, supra note 226, at 1033-55. But see Rothstein et aI., supra note 227, at 273 n. 
196 (noting that their proposal to adopt a medical definition of disability will not interfere with 
the individual's ability to benefit from worker's compensation or social security disability 
insurance). 
230 See Diller, supra note 226, at 1035. 
231 See id., at 1042. 
232 See id., at 1033. 
233 526 U.S. 795, 797-98 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff must explain why the Social 
Security Disability Income ("SSDI") contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she could 
"perform the essential functions of her previous job, at least with reasonable accommodations"). 
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claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side-by-side.,,234 In that case, 
the Court held that an ADA claim would not be automatically estopped by a 
seemingly conflicting prior Social Security benefits claim unless the person 
bringing the claim was unable to explain the conflict.235 Unfortunately, this 
decision has not prevented continued litigation over the estoppel issue.236 
This type of conflict continues to be an issue in claims involving both 
workers' compensation and the ADA. Employees who claim and receive 
benefits for some kind of disability under workers' compensation may be 
estopped from bringing an ADA claim for reasonable accommodation.237 Some 
courts will more closely scrutinize the situation, allowing the employee to 
attempt to reconcile any apparent inconsistencies between the two claims.238 
They do this because the two statutes under which the employee sought 
protection may serve different purposes and involve different inquiries into the 
nature of the disability. 239 
When a court applies judicial estoppel to foreclose an individual from 
bringing an ADA claim, it focuses its efforts on the disability and perceived 
inability to work. 240 This obstructs a central function of the ADA - to support 
the efforts of disabled individuals in obtaining employment - because it 
undermines its principal premise that people with disabilities should be 
presumed capable of working.241 
234 Id. at 802-03 (holding that the application for and receipt of ssm benefits does not 
automatically estop the recipient, or erect a strong presumption against the recipient's pursuit of 
ADA claim). 
235 See id. at 804-05. 
236 See, e.g., Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA Pub., 2000 WL 502858,7 (S.D.N. Y. 2000) 
(disagreeing with the holding of the Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., 525 U.S. 1119 (1999); 
Voisin v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d. 853, 857 (M.D. La. 2002) (distinguishing its 
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N. CONCLUSION 
The many social policies serving disabled individuals in this country have 
diverse and valuable goals. Efforts to narrowly tailor statutes to prevent 
individuals from being able to qualify for more than one benefit program may 
very well keep many deserving people from qualifying for any benefit program. 
The current system has its faults. It may require administrative efforts on the 
part of employers, and litigation may arise from time to time. But lofty goals 
sometimes require vague wording and skillful application. At this time, a huge 
change in the manner in which these programs define those eligible in order to 
prevent various statutes from overlapping would not seem to be necessary and 
would most likely harm those most in need of protection from discrimination 
and potential job loss. 
